Brigham Young University Education and Law Journal
Volume 2002 | Number 2

Article 5

Fall 3-2-2002

Special Education Attorneys' Fees after Buckhannon
Board & Care Home, Incorporated v. West Virginia
Department of Health and Human Resources
Mark C. Weber

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/elj
Part of the Education Law Commons, Legal Profession Commons, and the Special Education
and Teaching Commons
Recommended Citation
Mark C. Weber, Special Education Attorneys' Fees after Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Incorporated v. West Virginia Department of
Health and Human Resources, 2002 BYU Educ. & L.J. 273 (2002).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/elj/vol2002/iss2/5

.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brigham Young University
Education and Law Journal by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

SPECIAL EDUCATION ATTORNEYS' FEES AFTER

BUCKHANNON BOARD & CARE HOME,
INCORPORATED V. WEST VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN RESOURCES
Mark C. Weber*
On May 29, 2001, the United States Supreme Court decided
Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Incorporated v. West Vir1
ginia Department of Health and Human Resources. The Court
ruled that in order to be a "prevailing" party entitled to attorneys' fees under civil rights fees provisions, the claimant must
prevail before the court in a judgment on the merits or a con2
sent decree. The Court rejected the "catalyst theory," previously adopted by all but one of the regional circuit courts of appeals,;1 which permitted the claimant to obtain fees if the
lawsuit was the catalyst for a voluntary change in the defendant's conduct. Accordingly, it denied attorneys' fees in Buckhannon's case on the ground that the case ended in a dismissal
for mootness after the state repealed the rule the plaintiffs had
4
challenged as a violation of two civil rights laws.
Ever since the Handicapped Children's Protection Act of
5
1986 overturned the Supreme Court's decision in Smith v.
6
Robinson, federal law has permitted parents to obtain attar* Professor of Law, DePaul University. B.A. Columbia; J.D. Yale. Professor Weber is
the author of Special Education Law and Litigation Treatise (LRP Pubs. 1992 & 2d ed.
2002). Thanks to Andrea Kayne Kaufman for comments on a draft of this paper.
Thanks also to Janet Brewer and Victoria Napolitano, DePaul College of Law Class of
2001, for their research assistance, and to Sara Mauk for additional research. Special
thanks to Sarah Redfield and the participants in the Eighth Annual Education Law
Institute at Franklin Pierce Law Center for providing a sounding board for many of the
ideas presented here.© Mark C. Weber 2001.
1. 532 U.S. 598, 121 S. Ct. 1835 (2001).
2. !d. at 1840.
::l. See id. at 1839 n.3, 1852, nn. 4-5 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
4. !d. at 1838.
5. Pub. L. No. 99-372, 100 Stat. 796 (1986) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. ~
1415(i)(3)(B)-(G) (West 2001)).
6. 468 U.S. 992 (1984) (barring attorneys' fees in special education case).
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neys' fees for prevailing in administrative and judicial proceedings in special education cases. Because courts usually construe all civil rights attorneys' fees provisions in a similar
manner, the Buckhannon case will have important implications
for special education litigation. Many special education cases
are resolved without any formal decision from a judge or hearing officer. Frequently, the parent files a due process complaint, and the school district, under the pressure of a scheduled hearing, reviews the child's situation and provides the
program or services that the parent sought for the child or
drops its plans to change the child's program or placement. The
parent then withdraws the request or the hearing officer dismisses the case as moot. In other instances, the school district
makes a due process hearing request to initiate a student
evaluation or special education services without the parent's
consent but withdraws the request after the parent makes
clear that she will put up a defense at hearing. Under the law
prior to Buckhannon, the parent is entitled to attorney's fees in
those instances and can file suit to obtain an award even with7
out requesting any other relief. But if Buckhannon bars fees in
special education cases resolved without an adjudication on the
merits or a consent order, the school district will no longer have
to pay that parent's counsel fees.
This change in the law would work a significant reallocation of litigation resources from parents challenging school dis8
tricts to the districts. Moreover, parents wishing to obtain fees
and districts wishing to avoid fees are likely to alter their behavior to maximize their respective advantages. Both the potential shift of power in special education disputes and the
strategic maneuvering likely to accompany it need further
study. Although there has been significant scholarship on spe9
10
cial education attorneys' fees, the catalyst theory, and civil

7. See e.g. McSomebodies v. San Mateo City Sch. Dist., 8H7 F.2d 971 (1989) (establishing that action may be brought solely to obtain fees).
8. As students of law and economics have noted, attorneys' fees are simply another item of relief, and if the plaintiffs right to obtain them is limited, seltlements
will be biased downward. See Geoffrey P. Miller, An Economic Analysis of" Rule 68, 15
,J. Leg. Stud. 93 (1986).
9. The most comprehensive discussion in the law review literature is Thomas F.
Guernsey, The School Pays the Piper, But llow Much?: Attorneys' Fees in Special Edu·
cation Cases After the Handicapped Children'., Protection Act of ID86, 2:-l Wake Forest
L. Rev. 237 (1988); see also Mark C. Weber, Special Education Law and Litigation
Treatise ch. 22 (LHP Publications 1992 & supp. VIII 2000) (chapter discussing atior-
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rights attorneys' fees in general, the Buckhannon case has altered the legal terrain sufficiently to justify a new look.
This paper will describe the catalyst theory in Part One,
discuss Buckhannon's abolition of that theory in Part Two, consider the applicability of Buckhannon to special education litigation in Part Three, list some strategic implications of the application of the case to special education disputes in Part Four,
and map out a number of policy implications of applying the
case to special education litigation in Part Five.

I. THE CATALYST THEORY
For a generation, courts have held that civil rights claimants may recover attorneys' fees when they prevail in the sense
of achieving what they want from the litigation, even if the
case itself ends in a dismissal for mootness, a voluntary dismissal, or some other disposition that does not constitute a
courtroom victory. The claimants prevail when the litigation
has been the "catalyst" for a change that provides the relief the

ncys' fees in special education cases); Peter C. Hughes, Attorneys' Fees for Administra·
tiue Proceedings Under the HCPA and Contingency Enhancements, 58 Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. 909 (19~)()); Sheila K. Hyatt, The Remedies Gap: Compensation and lmplementa·
tion Under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, 17 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc.
Change 689, 728<ll (19~!0); Myron Schreck, Attorneys' Fees for Administratiue Proceedings Under the Education of the Handicapped Act: Of Carey, Crest Street and Congres·
sional Intent, 60 Temp. L.Q. 59!!, 639-50 (1987).
10. See .Joel H. Trotter, The Catalyst Theory of Civil Rights Fee Shifting After
Farrar u. Jlobby, 80 Va. L. Rev. 1429 (HJ94); Martin Patrick Averill, Comment, "Spec·
ters" and "Litigious Fog"2: The Fourth Circuit Abandons Catalyst Theory in S-1 & S-2
by and Throur:h P-1 & P-2 u. State Board of Education of North Carolina, 73 N.C. L.
Rev. 2245 (UJ95). Commentary specifically on Buckhannon's overturning of the catalyst
theory includes: Adam Babich, Fee Shifting After Buckhannon, 32 Envtl. L. Rep. 10137
(2002); David Arkush, Note, Preserving "Catalyst" Attorneys' Fees Under the Freedom of
Information Act in the Wake of Buckhannon Board and Care Home v. West Virr:inia
Department of Health and Human Services, :{7 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 131 (2002);
Caroline L. Curry, Recent Deuelopments, 54 Ark. L. Rev. 727 (2001); Note, Leading
Cases, 115 Harv. L. Hev. 457 (2001); see also Mary D. Fan, Case Note, 111 Yale L..J.
1251-52 (2002) (describing Buckhannon as "a recent example of the Supreme Court's
mounting disregard for legislative history .... ").
11. See e.g. Peter H. Huang, A New Options Theory for Risk Multipliers of Attar·
ney's Fees in Federal Civil Rights Litigation, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1~!43 (1998); Keith Hylton, Fee Shifting and lncentives to Comply with the Law, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 1069 (1993);
Bernard l'. Cocld, Comment, Grossly Excessive Attorney's Fee Requests under the Civil
Rir:hts Attorney's Fee Awards Act: Should the Entire Fee Request Be Denied?, 24 U.
Bait. L. Hev. 119 (EJ94); Davirl Shub, Note, Priuate Attorneys General, Prevailing Par·
ties, nnd Public Benefit: Attorney's Fees Awards for Civil Rights Plaintiffs, 42 Duke L.,J.
706 (l ~HJ2).
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claimants sought, even though there is no adjudication. Relying
on language in the legislative history of the 1976 Civil Rights
12
Attorney's Fees Awards Act, courts concluded almost immediately after the passage of that law that civil rights plaintiffs
could obtain fees in the absence of a judgment from a court if
t~ey prevailed in obtaining what they sought from the litiga1
tion.
The catalyst theory gained strength from comments in various Supreme Court cases saying it was settled law that fees
were available if the litigation vindicated the claimant's civil
rights, even in the absence of a formal judgment in the claim14
ant's favor. In 1994, however, the Fourth Circuit Court of Ap15
peals determined in S-1 v. Board of Education that the catalyst rule was inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision in
16
Farrar v. Hobby. For its part, Farrar entailed only the proposition that a minor victory on one of twenty claims did not
make the plaintiff a prevailing party; accordingly, nine other
courts of appeals considered Farrar irrelevant to the issue and
17
reaffirmed the catalyst theory despite S-1. At the time of the
12. H.R. Rpt. 94-1558, at 7 (Sept. 15, 1976) ("[A]fter a complaint is filed, a defendant might voluntarily cease the unlawful practice. A court should still award fees even
though it might conclude, as a matter of equity that no formal relief, such as an injunction, is needed."); see Sen. Rpt. 94-1011, at 5 (.Ttme 29, 1976), ("For purposes of the
award of cotmsel fees, parties may be considered to have prevailed when they vindicate
rights through a consent judgment or without formally obtaining relief.").
13. See e.g. Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 279-81 (1st Cir. 1978). ,Justice
Ginsburg's dissent cites eleven other court of appeals decisions predating the Supreme
Court's Hewitt u. Helms decision, 482 U.S. 755, 760 (1987), which tmsmprisingly described the "catalyst theory" as "settled law." Buckhannon, 121 S. Ct. at 1852 n. 4
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The only circuit not to adopt the catalyst theory was the
Federal Circuit, which did not have the opportunity to consider the issue. See id. at
1851.
14. Ilewitt, 482 U.S. at 760 (describing entitlement to fees as "settled law" in
situation where "voltmtary action by the defendant ... affords the plaintiff all or some
of the relief sought," and reserving question when catalyst theory justifies fee award);
see Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 102, 111 (1992) (also recognizing rule).
15. 21 F.3d 49, 51 (4th Cir. 1994) (en bane).
16. 506 U.S. 103.
17. Stanton v. S. Berkshire Regl. Sch. Dist., HJ7 F.ad 574,577 n.2 (1st Cir. 1999);
Morris v. West Palm Beach, 194 F.3d 1203, 1207 (11th Cir. l~J99); Payne u. Bd. of
Educ., 88 F.3d 392, 397 (6th Cir. HJ96); Ma.rbley v. Bane, 57 F.3d 224, 234 (2d Cir.
1995); Kilgour v. Pasadena, 5:~ F.3d 1007, 1010 (9th Cir. 1995); Zinn. u. Shalala, 35
F.3d 273, 276 (7th Cir. 1994); Beard v. Teska, 31 F.3d 942, 951-52 (lOth Cir. HJ94);
Baumgartner v. Harrisburg Hous. Aut h., 21 F.3d 541, 546-50 (:1d Cir. 1994); Little Rock
Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski City Sch. Dist. No. 1, 17 F.:3d 260, 268 n.2 (8th Cir. 1994). The Supreme Court mqjority opinion vindicated those courts in some measure by noting that
Farrar is irrelevant to the catalyst thteory's validity. See Buckhannon, 121 S. Ct. at

273]

SPECIAL EDUCATION ATTORNEYS' FEES

277

Buckhannon decision, the catalyst theory was alive and well
everywhere except the Fourth Circuit.
II. THE BUCKHANNON DECISION
Buckhannon, an operator of assisted living residences, received an order from the West Virginia state fire marshal to
shut down its facilities because some of its residents were so
disabled that they could not get to an emergency exit without
18
assistance in the event of a fire. Buckhannon argued that it
could provide the necessary help in evacuating the residents
and that failure to modify the rule constituted disability dis20
crimination.19 Buckhannon sued under the Fair Housing Act
21
Amendments of 1988 and the Americans with Disabilities Act
22
(ADA) of 1990. The court awarded Buckhannon a temporary
restraining order against enforcement of the provision and
22
then extended that relief under an interim agreed order.
Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their damages claims in the
face of defendants' sovereign immunity defense but defeated
the defendants' motion to dismiss the claim for permanent in24
junctive relief. Less than a month after denial of the defendants' motion, the state legislature repealed the rule under
25
which the fire marshal had acted. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the case as moot, though it sanctioned the defendants for multiplying plaintiffs' expenses bls
6
failing to notify them of the imminent repeal of the rule.
Plaintiffs moved for attorneys' fees, contending that the suit
motivated the legislature to change the rule, but the court denied the motion under the then-unique rule of the Fourth CirJil:iH n.4.
18. Buckhannon, 121 S. Ct. at lil39.
HJ. Id.
20. Co-plaintiff with the facilities operator was 102-year-old Dorsey Pierce, one of
the residents who could not exit without assistance but who apparently wanted to continue to live in the less restrictive environment of an assisted living facility rather than
a nursing home or institutional setting. See id. at 1850 (Ginsburg, ,J., dissenting).
Presidential history buffs (or perhaps those looking for bad omens for the plaintiffs)
may note the <Hid conjunction of Pierce and a homophone of Buchanan.
21. 42 U .S.C.~~ :1601-:3607 (1994).
22. 42U.S.C.§§ 12101-12213(HJ94).
2:1. /3uckhan.non, 121 S. Ct. at lil:i8.
21. !d. at l8:1H n. 1, l8GO (Ginsburg, .J., dissenting).
25. Jd.atl850.
26. !d. at 18:lH n. 2.
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cuit that fees are available only when there is a judgment, consent decree, or settlement. The court of appeals affirmed, and
27
the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The Supreme Court affirmed in an opinion by Chief Justice
Rehnquist. The Court reasoned that fees are available only to
civil rights claimants who are "prevailing" parties, and that the
term "prevailing" means one who has been awarded some relief
28
by the court. A legal dictionary and language used in earlier
29
cases supported the definition. Although a consent decree justifies fees on the ground that it is a judicially-ordered change in
the legal relationship between the parties, success without judicially-sanctioned change does not justify fees. The Court
found the language in earlier cases approving the catalyst theory unpersuasive and similarly rejected language in the legislative history of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act. :JO
Finally, the Court discounted predictions by the plaintiffs that
defendants would intentionally moot cases to avoid fees and
hence diminish the incentives for civil rights litigation, noting
that no empirical evidence had emerged from the Fourth Circuit to support those results; the Court also weighed the potential harm against the possibility that fear of fees may keep
31
some defendants from settling cases. Justice Scalia wrote a
concurrence, joined by Justice Thomas, dilating on the meaning
of the term "prevailing" and on the risk of settlements "ex32
torted" by the fear of fees awards.
Justice Ginsburg dissented, joined by Justices Stevens,
33
Souter, and Breyer. She stressed the extensive precedent
from the circuit courts supporting the catalyst theory and contended that "prevailing," if interpreted in a practical sense and
in the sense found in previous Supreme Court cases, means ob34
taining what the party sought, even without a judgment.: She
27. ld. at 1839.
28. ld.
29. ld. at 1839-40.
30. ld. at 1841-42.
31. ld. at 1842. The Court noted the limits on mootness doctrine and the desirability of avoiding satellite litigation over fees. !d. at 184:-l.
32. ld. at 1843-48 (Scalia, .J., concurring). Justice Scalia further disparaged the
post-S-1 circuit court cases as instances in which the Supreme Court's dicta had misled
the courts.ld. at 1849.
3:-l. ld. at 1849 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 1851-53. Justice Ginsberg also relied on a Supreme Court case, Mansfield, C. & L.M.R. Co. u. Swan, 111 U.S. 379 ( 1884), in which a cost award, whkh
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argued that the legislative history provisions found unconvincing by the majority were "hardly ambiguous" and evinced clear
congressional intent to interpret the term "prevailing" in a
35
practical way that embraces the catalyst rule. She rejected
the majority's policy arguments, suggesting that far from inducing defendants to resist change in order to avoid fees
awards, the catalyst rule provides an incentive for defendants
to act promptly to avoid additional fees liability. The factual
determination whether the lawsuit motivated the change is no
more difficult than other factual determinations, and the role of
the district court is to insure that fees are not awarded when
the case lacks enough legal merit to have motivated the defendant to change its ways to avoid an unfavorable court deci.

~6

SlOn.

III. BUCKHANNON'S APPLICABILITY TO SPECIAL EDUCATION
LITIGATION

Buckhannon did not involve the attorneys' fees provision in
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), the
statute that establishes the rights at issue in most special edu17
cation cases.= Nevertheless, an observer needs little foresight
to predict that many courts will be inclined to apply Buckhannon to special education disputes. Not only do the courts typically construe all civil rights attorneys' fees provisions in a like
38
manner, but also the Fourth Circuit first departed from the
39
catalyst theory in a special education attorneys' fees case. Although the Supreme Court rejected the reasoning of the Fourth
Circuit's decision, it endorsed the result.
In response, it may be argued that the IDEA fees provision

would be available only to a prevailing party, was given to a party that did not succeed
in court. Buckhannon, 121 S. Ct. at 1853-54 (Ginsburg, .T., dissenting). The majority
distinguished the case by stating that the Court must have used its discretion to award
costs to the party that did not prevail on accotmt of the "legally successful whipsawing
tactics" of its opponent. !d. at 1811 n.8 .•Justice Ginsburg further supported her practical definition of the term with treatises and state cases regarding costs. !d. at 1855
(Ginsburg, ,J., dissenting).
:l5. !d. at 1857-58.
:lG. !d. at 1859.
:17. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400 et seq. (West 2001)
:)8. See llensley v. Eckerhart, 4Gl U.S. 424, 433 n. 7 (1983).
:l~J. See S-1, 21 F.:ld at 19.
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was adopted ten years after the original Civil Rights Attorney's
Fees Awards Act of 1976, at a time when Congress was well
aware of the wide use of the catalyst theory and long before the
Fourth Circuit's rejection ofthe theory. The catalyst theory was
so well-recognized that Strom Thurmond and Orrin Hatch
sponsored bills to overturn it in 1985 and 1987. As Senator
Hatch declaimed to the Senate in 1985:
Due to the protracted nature of some litigation, a claim may
be rendered moot by State and Federal legislation enacted
prior to judicial resolution of the conflict. Under existing case
law, such a turn of events would not preclude a recovery of attorneys' fees where a court determined
that the case was a
40
catalyst for the legislative change.

Despite Senator Hatch's effort to illustrate what he saw as
one of the fatal flaws in the catalyst theory, both his and Senator Thurmond's bills were unsuccessful.
Congress might be said to have acquiesced in the lower
courts' adoption of the catalyst theory, and by failing to make
an exception to the theory when it adopted the IDEA provision,
Congress enacted the catalyst approach. Notably, the IDEA
provision does create exceptions to several other constructions
of the civil rights attorneys' fees laws by barring multipliers
and bonuses and creating an elaborate administrative offer of
41
judgment rule. By failing to act as it did in those instances,
Congress adopted the widely understood construction of the
term "prevailing" in the attorneys' fees provision.
However persuasive that argument may be, a skeptic would
reply that Buckhannon itself concerned two fee provisions that
were also adopted well after the passage of the 1976 Act, at a
time when the catalyst theory was well established and presumably well known to Congress; yet the Buckhannon opinion
does not even bother to discuss the argument of Congressional
acquiescence. That oversight may have been a result of the
Court's rush to complete its business before the end of the
42
term, and it is of course possible that the Court might revise
its position if it were to consider the argument soberly. Nonetheless, the Court's complete omission of the topic provides little encouragement to those who would make a congressional

40. 131 Cong. Rec. 810800-01 (daily eel. Aug. 1, 1985).
41. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(C)-(D)(i) (West 2001).
42. The opinion came down May 29, 2001.
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acquiescence argument in a special education attorneys' fees
case.
It remains true that the argument that Congress intended
to adopt the existing construction of "prevailing" in the Handicapped Children's Protection Act is stronger than the argument
implicitly rejected with regard to the ADA and Fair Housing
Act Amendments, for those latter statutes did not include provisions rejecting various other extant interpretations of section
48
1988. The failure to reject the construction of "prevailing"
thus looks more intentional with regard to IDEA than with the
other two statutes. Whether courts will credit that distinction
remains uncertain.
If the courts do apply Buckhannon to special education
cases, the application could be either broad or narrow. The
facts of Buckhannon are extreme in that a legislative change in
the law mooted the case, and legislative motivation is notori44
ously difficult to discern. Some members of the legislature
may have acted to moot the case, others because they believed
in the merits of the position being adopted, others because of
logrolling or political considerations, and still others because
they hit the wrong button on their desks. A decision by a special education director to provide requested services to a specific student, say a decision taken immediately after a settlement conference and memorialized in an enforceable, written
document such as an Individualized Education Program (IEP),
is a much clearer instance in which the litigation led to theresult without adjudication. Buckhannon's facts do not require
the denial of fees in that utterly dissimilar situation. Nor would
an analogy to the case require denial of fees for relief written
into a new IEP after a mediation session or in a stipulation to
dismiss that does not amount to a consent decree.

43. See Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § :l613(c)(2) (1994); Americans with Disabilites Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12205 (1994).
44. See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224 (1971) ("[l]t is extremely difficult
for a court to ascertain the motivation, or collection of different motivations, that lie
behind a legislative enactment."). On occasion, however, the Supreme Court has scrutinized legislative motivation and found statutes tmconstitutional on account of illegitimate purposes. See e.g. llunter u. Underwood, 171 U.S. 222 ( 1985) (finding enactment tmconstitutional on account of racially discriminatory motivation); Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, 364 U.S. :J:l9 (1960) (same). See generally .John Hart Ely, Legislatiue and
Administra.tiue Motiucttion in Constitutional Law, 79 Yale L .•J. 1205 (1970) (discussing
necessity of discerning legislative intent in many instances and problems with doing
so).
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The Court's language, however, suggests a much broader
application of the case. At various points, the majority opinion
says that fees are not available unless the party has been
"awarded some relief by the court," unless there has been a
'judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the
parties," and unless there is a 'judicial imprimatur on the
45
change." The crucial "unless" is that unless Buckhannon is
strictly limited to its facts, it would bar fees awards in the
situation posited above however clear the defendant's motivation might in fact have been.

15. Buckhannon, 121 S. Ct. at 1839-40. Preliminary indications are that courts
are applying Buckhannon to special education cases, in some instances taking the
Court's comments broadly. See e.g. J.C. u. Reg'l Sch. Dist. 10, 278 F.3d !19 (2d Cir.
2002) (overturning award of fees when hearing officer dismissed due process hearing as
moot after district made changes in IEP and dropped expulsion proceedings); Jose Luis
R. u. Joliet Township High Sch. Dist. 204, 2002 WL 54544 (N.D. Ill. .Jan. 15, 2002) (denying fees for settlement agreement reached at mediation following hearing request,
when agreement had been read into record before hearing otlicer without statement of
approval by hearing officer); .John 7'. u. Del. County Intermediate Unit, 2001 WL
l:'l91500 (Nov. 7, 2001) (denying fees when action ended in voluntary dismissal by
plaintiffs); J.S. u. Ramapo Cent. Sch. Dist., 165 I<'. Supp. 2d 570 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (denying fees when defendant paid child's tuition at private school and reimbursed parents
and parents did not pursue due process hearing request to resolution); Baer u. Klagholz, 786 A.2d 907 (N .•J. Super. Ct. 2001) (denying fees for hours spent challenging
regulations that defendant ultimately amended without court order or consent judgment); see also Akinseye v. D.C., 2002 WL 522883 (}).D.C. Mar. 19, 2002) (denying interest on previous fee awards for settlements on basis of Buckhannon, but expressing
reservations about wisdom of application of Buckhannon to IDEA administrative proceedings). But see Johnson u. D.C., 190 F. Supp. 2d 34,15 (D.D.C. 2002) (not extending
Buckhannon to bar fees for private settlements of IDEA cases during a<lministrative
proceedings); Brandon K. u. New Lenox Sch. Disl., 2001 WL 1491199 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 23,
2001) (denying motion to dismiss fees claim when settlement reached before hearing
was transcribed and entered into due process hearing record as agreed order of hearing
officer); Christina A. u. Bloomberg, 167 F. Supp. 2d 1094 (D.S.D. 2001) (awarding fees
based on settlement agreement approved by district court with retention of jurisdiction, though recognizing agreement not to be formal consent decree); Sabatini v. Corning-Painted Post Area Sch. Dist., 190 F. Supp. 2d 509 (W.D.N.Y. 20()1) (awarding fees
when action terminated in settlement agreement incorporated in consent order, following entry of preliminary injtmction); see also L.C. v. Waterbury Bd. of Educ., 2002 WL
519715 (D. Conn. Mar. 21, 2002) (awarding fees despite argument based on Buckhannon when hearing officl~r ordered residential placement but parents chose not to enroll
child). The .Johnson court ruled that a district's consistent policy or practice of conditioning settlement officers on fee waivers may constitute a violation of TDEA. ,Johnson,
190 F. Supp. 2d at 42-18 (denying motion to dismiss cha!Jenge to policy but denying
request for immediate injunctive relief).
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IV. STRATEGIC EFFECTS OF APPLICATION OF BUCKHANNON TO
SPECIAL EDUCATION CASES

If Buckhannon reaches special education disputes and is
applied in a broad fashion, it will affect the parties' litigation
strategies, both with regard to their settlement postures and
the claims they make and defenses they assert.

A. Settlement Dynamics
Application of Buckhannon to special education attorneys'
fees would affect the dynamics of settlement negotiations. For a
rational school district, a dollar spent on attorneys' fees is the
same as a dollar spent on services for a child. A rational but
impecunious parent must balance the need for educational services for her child against the need to pay the family's bills. If a
school district can plausibly threaten to moot the case and thus
eliminate all entitlement to fees, that threat will induce a rational parent to sign a formal settlement for a lesser amount of
services or other relief as long as settling the case now will provide some cash to pay the parent's attorney or at least eliminate additional payments for the attorney's services. Thus a
change in the fees entitlement can be expected to work a
change in posture of both sides of the dispute and a reduction
in the relief that parents obtain in settled cases.
With regard to a more narrow aspect of litigation strategy,
application of Buckhannon would diminish the parent's incentive to pursue mediation, an option that the law currently encourages.41; Although the parent would retain some incentive to
pursue mediation in order to dispose of the dispute promptly
and stop amassing legal bills, a new incentive would exist for
parents and their lawyers to keep the dispute alive through the
hearing in the hope of obtaining relief and with it an entitlement to fees.
B. Asserting Claims and Defenses
If Buckhannon governs special education attorneys' fees,
the impact will not be limited to settlement dynamics but will
also affect the framing of special education claims and the defenses that school districts raise against them. The obvious de46. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (West 2001) (establishing procedures to implement
and encourage use of mediation of special education disputes).
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fense to consider is that of mootness, and the relevant claims
include those for specific relief and for damages.

1. The M ootness Defense
In actions initiated by parents, school districts may voluntarily provide the child with the relief the parents sought and
then seek to dismiss the case on the ground that it is moot.
Courts in the federal system and in most states refuse to decide
47
moot cases. If Buckhannon is applied to special education attorneys' fees, parent attorneys can be expected to resist mootness dismissals with new vigor.
Two doctrines may assist the parents' effort. The first doctrine is that the mere voluntary cessation of illegal activity
does not moot a case if the defendant remains free to resume
its actions. This is the familiar rule of United States u. W. T.
48
Grant Co. : even if the defendant has changed its ways under
the threat or reality of litigation, there remains a viable case
for injunctive relief to keep the defendant in line. However,
there must be some probability that the defendant will in fact
49
return to its old ways.
The second, independent doctrine that limits mootness dismissals is that an action remains alive when the conduct at issue is capable of repetition yet evades review in the course of a
typical proceeding. The most familiar application of this doctrine is a case challenging the constitutionality of abortion restrictions. By the time the case is adjudicated, the pregnancy
will have ended. The Supreme Court has held that the events
do not moot the case in those circumstances, for otherwise the
50
case will never be adjudicated. Nevertheless, the repetitionyet-evasion-of-review must apply to the party actually before
the court. In a special education case challenging a disciplinary
suspension, the Court permitted the case to proceed on behalf

47. See e.g. Smith v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 184 F.3d 764 (8th Cir. 1999) (dismissing IDEA claim for services as moot when student had moved); N.Y. St. Sch. Bds.
Assn. v. N.Y. St. Ed. of Regents, 619 N.Y.S.2d 837 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (dismissing
challenge to regulation after change in regulation).
48. 345 u.s. 629 (1953).
49. See e.g. Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401-02 (1975) (finding challenge to
transfer of prisoner moot); Richard H. Fallon, Daniel J. Mettzer & David L Shapiro,
Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and The Federal System 219-220 (4th ed.,
Foundation Press, Inc. 1996) (collecting additional cases).
50. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973).
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of one student on the ground that there was a reasonable prob51
ability he would again be subject to suspension but held the
case moot as to a second student who had graduated and was
52
no longer eligible for public school services.
The degree of success that parents will have in resisting
mootness dismissals is one of the areas of uncertainty with regard to Buckhannon's application to special education disputes.
School districts can be expected to argue that changes they
make in an IEP create an enforceable document that effectively
ends a controversy. Parents can be expected to argue that the
IEP is subject to change by the school district at any time on
any ground, real or pretextual. Satellite litigation will ensue
over the permanence of the changes in the program. Claims for
53
4
compensatory education or monetary relief" also keep a case
from being considered moot, though many special education
cases lack the grounds for those claims. The availability of
55
damages relief is discussed at greater length below.
2. Claims for Specific Relief

Until now, the advice for lawyers eager to obtain fees has
been to resist making extravagant claims for specific relief,
such as improved programs or placements, on behalf of a student. Frequently, courts weigh what the parent originally
sought ~~ainst what she obtained and reduce the fees proportionally,·' so it makes sense not to make outlandish demands in
the first place. This advice may no longer hold because the
more restrained the request for relief, the easier it is for the
district to moot the case and eliminate fees altogether. Of

51. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 318-23 n. 6 (1988).
52. Id. at 318. Not bound by the federal approach to mootness, a state court has
applied a broader exception to conventional mootness rules, refusing to dismiss a case
challenging disciplinary procedures on the ground that the conduct complained of was
capable of repetition yet evading review with regard to other students. Bd. of Trustees
u. Doe, 508 S.2d 1081 (Miss. 1987).
53. Mason v. Schenectady City Sch. Dist., 879 F. Supp. 215 (N.D.N.Y. 1993).
54. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist. u. Wartenberg, 59 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 1995).
55. See infra text accompanying notes 59-65.
56. See e.g. AndrewS. v. Sch. Comm., 59 F. Supp. 2d 237 (D. Mass. 1999) (awarding reduced fees when parents obtained staff and teacher training but not private
placement). Some courts have denied fees altogether when parents achieved minimal
success after making more extreme demands. See e.g. Linda W. u. Ind. Dept. of Educ.,
200 F.3d 504 (7th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 816 (2000) (denying fees when parents won compensation for tutoring but failed on main tuition reimbursement claim).
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course, if the parent throws caution to the wind in framing her
request for relief, the district may be able to reduce fees liabil7
ity by using the offer of judgment rules 5 or making motions to
dismiss parts of the claim.

3. Damages Claims
A pending claim for damages relief keeps a case from bein~
moot, as Chief Justice Rehnquist recognized in Buckhannon.
Although the range of special education cases in which parents
can obtain monetary relief is limited, Buckhannon gives parents an inducement to push the limits and add money claims to
keep the case from becoming moot. Hearing officers generally
deny that they have the power to afford any damages relief
other than tuition reimbursement, so a dispute that includes a
damages claim will remain alive at least up through the filing
of an action in court. Districts may be able to counter the
prayer for damages by using the offer of judgment rules to limit
fees liability to that incurred prior to an offer that is at least as
good as what the parent ultimately receives through litigation,
but the damages strategy affords at least some prospect of fees
if not of cash relief itself.
The federal circuits are in disarray as to what factual predi59
cates support damages claims beyond tuition reimbursement,
but courts have permitted compensatory damages awards for
60
conduct such as educational neglect, failure to provide acces61
62
sible facilities, violations of procedural rights, and disability

57. See 20 U.S. C. § 1415(i)(3)(D)(i) (West 2001); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 68.
58. See Buckhannon, 121 S. Ct. at 1842 ("[S]o long as the plaintiff has a cause of
action for damages, a defendant's change in conduct will not moot the case.").
59. See Mark C. Weber, Damages Liability in Special Education Cases, 21 Rev.
Litig. 83, 84-92 (2002) (collecting and discussing authorities). In order have a claim for
tuition reimbursement (as opposed to compensatory damages), the parent must have
expended money for private schooling in a situation in which the school district failed
to make a free, appropriate public education available to the child in a timely manner.
20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) (West 2001); see Florence County Sch. Dist. 4 v. Carter,
510 U.S. 7 (1993) (discussing reimbursement relief under IDEA).
60. See e.g W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484 (3d Cir. 1995) (upholding claim for damages for alleged delay in evaluation and placement of child with disabilities).
61. See e.g. McKay v. Bd. of Educ, 1997 WL 816505 (D. Me. 1997) (denying motion
to dismiss damages claims for failure to make school building accessible).
62. See e.g. Quackenbush v. Johnson City Sch. Dist., 716 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1983)
(permitting action for damages when defendant allegedly forged form, preventing exercise of procedural rights).
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harassment. : Many courts allow such claims whenever there is
a supEorted assertion of bad faith conduct or gross misjudg4
ment. ' More claims of this type should be anticipated as parents and their advocates push for more effective relief and try
to stave off mootness in the meantime.
V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF APPLYING BUCKHANNON TO
SPECIAL EDUCATION CASES

Loss of an entitlement to judicial relief is a reallocation of
resources. Parents who lose the opportunity to obtain fees
when the litigation causes a school district to provide relief
prior to adjudication will be out of pocket for the attorney fees.
Thus, they have less of an incentive to pursue their rights under IDEA, and attorneys who hope to be paid have less of an
incentive to take special education cases.
The loss is particularly acute when parents have the choice
of purchasing educational services for the child on the open
market for a set number of years before either high school
graduation or age twenty-one (and the loss of IDEA eligibility),
or continuing within the public education system and fighting
the inevitable legal battles to procure acceptable special education services. The parent with scarce resources can spend the
money on private tuition and forgo her rights under the law, or
she can incur the expense of an attorney on the prospect of getting the services from the school district and the nowdiminished prospect of obtaining fees on account of getting the
services via adjudication or consent order. Since a dollar spent
on tuition is equal to a dollar spent on an attorney, the parent
may well choose to give up the right to a free education to ensure that the child actually receives necessary services. The
policy effect of the abolition of the catalyst rule is the loss of
cost-free schooling for children with disabilities.
As indicated above, in cases that are formally settled, there
63. See e.g. Baird v. Rose, 192 F.3d 462 (4th Cir. 1999) (denying motion to dismiss
damages claim in which teacher allegedly humiliated student with severe depression
and excluded her from academic activity). See generally Mark C. Weber, Disability
Harassment in the Public Schools, 43 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1079 (2002).
64. This test is frequently applied for damages claims under section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S. C.§ 794 (1994). See e.g. Walker v. D.C., 969 F. Supp.
794 (D.D.C. 1997) (permitting liability); T.J. W. v. Bd. o{ Educ., 26 IDELR 999 (M.D.
Ala. 1997) (same); see also Thompson v. Bd.o{ Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 144 F.3d 574
(8th Cir. 1998) (applying test but denying liability).
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will be a similar dynamic in which the parent is induced to
trade relief for the child against payment of legal bills. The
higher the fees, the stronger the incentive to settle for some
amount in cash to cover them even if it means less in the way
of services for the child. Again, the child's right to free, appropriate public education is lost.
The increased difficulty of recovering fees is also likely to
diminish the market for legal services in special education
cases. The whole purpose of the fee-shifting statutes is to enhance the availability of attorneys who will take on the litigation. Chipping away at the entitlement reduces the incentive
for lawyers to allocate their time to special education cases
rather than more lucrative matters.
These policy implications of Buckhannon are simply specific
applications of what can be expected to happen in public interest litigation in general as a result of the case. A prominent legal newspaper reported:
The ruling will have a "profound adverse effect on the economics of public interest litigation," says veteran environmental litigator John Eccheverria of Georgetown University
School of Law. "It will increase the risk that thousands of
hours of legal time invested in a case will never be reimbursed even if the litigation in fact is successful and accomplished its objective." ... Plaintiffs' attorneys say that the ruling gives defendants an incentive to drive litigation along,
requiring plaintiffs' counsel to expend significant resources
and then, at the 11th hour when plaintiffs appear likely to
prevail, unilaterally change their policies to moot the litiga65
tion and avoid a fees award.

On the other side of the coin, there may be some positive
impact on the availability of special education services if the
school districts are currently withholding provision of services
so that it does not look as though litigation caused them to give
66
them to the child, thus creating the basis for a fees award.
Whether this incentive matters is dubious, however. Under the
catalyst rule, the defendant always has an incentive to afford
the relief to which the claimant is entitled in order to stop ac67
cumulating additional fees liability.
65.
66.
torney's
67.

Marcia Coyle, Fee Change i8 a Sea-Change, Nat!. L.J., AI (June 11, 2001).
See Buckhannon, 121 S. Ct. at 1842 ("[T]he possibility of being assessed atfees may well deter a defendant from altering its conduct.").
See id. at 1859 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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If parents' attorneys make the predictable response of appending damages claims to their special education complaints,
additional systemic results will ensue. Few things raise the
tension in a lawsuit more than a claim for damages, and this is
especially likely in the context of special education. Since bad
68
faith conduct or gross misjudgment is a basis for the claim,
charges of personal misconduct are inevitable and will give rise
to wounded feelings and lingering resentment. Subtle or lessthan-subtle retaliation may visit the child who continues in the
school environment with the personnel who have been subject
69
to the charges of bad faith and misconduct.

VI. CONCLUSION
The courts may not apply Buckhannon to special education
litigation fee awards, but there is a clear likelihood that they
will. If Buckhannon is adopted, the policy effects could be profound, eroding the availability of legal services in an area in
which Congress provided fee awards specifically to enhance the
supply of legal counsel. As lawyers pursue damages claims and
other more aggressive forms of relief, they may provide some
insulation from claims of mootness but may create more antagonistic relationships between parents and school districts.

68. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
69. Long-term deterioration in the relationship between parents and school district, with attendant potential harm to the child, is not unknown in special education
disputes. In one case, the court ordered a child placed in a different school in the district on account of the hostility between the personnel in the child's original school and
the parents. Metro. Gout. u. Guest, 28 IDLER 290 (M.D. Tenn. 1998); see also Bd. of
Educ. u. Ill. St. Bd. of Educ., 938 F.2d 712 (7th Cir. 1991) (affirming private placement
in part on basis of parental hostility).

